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ABSTRACT
Abby Flickinger: The Politics of Everyday Subversion: Crisis, COVID-19, and Coming-ofAge in Córdoba, Argentina
This thesis seeks to explore the impact of converging political, economic, and
public health crises in Córdoba, Argentina in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic with a
focus on youth and practices of protest and resistance. Utilizing interviews, participant
observations and ethnographic data in addition to economic and public health statistics,
media coverage, and government statements I establish the basis and context for this
triple crisis, as well as the tactics appropriated to criticize the government and
expression disillusionment — protests and subversion. Despite modifications to public
health concerns, the Argentine democratic tradition of protesting returned against
government wishes, and became a canvas of expression for new subversive meanings to
enhance movement messages. Protests also became a place to express local culture and
youth subculture, as young people appropriated private and public spaces to recreate
cultural practices in an attempt to rebuild a sense of normalcy. Cognizant of the nuance
and complexities of pandemic management, young people sought not to rebel and
topple the government, but rather entered a state of self-governance, choosing to
undermine government protocols they deemed unnecessary to return themselves to a
sense of normalcy the government had failed to, and to reconstruct a semblance of the
future that has been dismantled by the ensuing triple crisis.
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Introduction
On March 20th, 2020, as the Argentine government declared a nationwide
lockdown to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Overnight the city of Córdoba, Argentina
transformed into a ghost town; bars packed the night before sat empty, the loud
morning commute silenced, and police stood guard on every corner. The lockdown
quickly transformed from a two-week precautionary measure to an ongoing reality.
Businesses were boarded up, tens of thousands lost their jobs, and lines grew outside of
food banks. COVID-19 case numbers began to rise from tens to hundreds. This early
self-induced paralysis was heralded, and set the tone for Latin America. However, this
lockdown approach began to break down, cases skyrocketed, and Argentines faced a
difficult situation of convergent political, economic, and public health crises.

Research Question
The onset of COVID-19 converged with a preexisting economic recession and a
political transition from a center-right neoliberal administration to a center-left Peronist
administration. Córdoba, the nation’s second city, found itself in a multi-dimensional
economic, political, and public health crisis that fundamentally restructured everyday
life while calling the future into question as the result of state’s failure to protect the
population on these fronts. This begs the central research question: How have the
people of Córdoba responded to this triple crisis catalyzed by COVID-19? This project
explores this question through the analysis of federal government policies and protest
practices in Córdoba in response to this triple crisis. This thesis specifically focuses on
youth society in Córdoba and practices of protest and resistance.
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To answer this question, this thesis concretely examines three key sub-questions.
Firstly, what policies taken the Macri administration (2015-2019) and the current
Fernández administration (2019-present) have contributed to political and economic
turmoil that then intersected with and exacerbated the COVID-19 pandemic? Secondly,
how did the people of Córdoba mobilize politically and organize protests in 2020
throughout the phases of lockdown to highlight these crises and denounce government
responses? Thirdly, what was the response of youth society in Córdoba to this triple
crisis and how did young adults cultivate new forms of interacting, socializing, and
protesting in this situation? Each of these questions will be addressed in the empirical
chapters of this thesis.

Argument
This thesis argues that Cordobense youth became disillusioned by state failures to
contain the spread of COVID-19 and adequately navigate the economic fallout of these
failed approaches, and embraced a politics of everyday subversion. Rather than taking
to the streets to topple the government or organize strikes, Cordobense youth expressed
disenchantment with the government but understood the exceptionalism of the
situation. Cordobense youth turned to practices of subversion that flouted the public
health restrictions put in place by the government, and embraced a return to
togetherness, dancing, music, and socializing—youth subcultural rebellion. This became
a form of youth protest against the failures of the government and the sense that the
future possibilities of the nation were being constrained. They sought to restore a sense
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of normalcy to their lives, motivated not to combat the government, but rather to form a
sense of solidarity and re-create a recognizable future for themselves.

Methodology and Overview
This thesis is a mixed-methods study of the political, economic, and public health
crisis in Argentina, its impact on traditional social and cultural phenomena, and
subsequent your responses in Córdoba, Argentina. To do this, I conducted IRB approved
interviews with 10 young people from Córdoba, all middle class and in their early
twenties, with a mixture of male and female participants. In addition to interviews, I
gathered ethnographic data though participant observation. I lived in the city from
March 1st until the end of December, 2020, experiencing normal life before lockdown in
addition to COVID management measures. I conducted research in public spaces like
cafes, bars, restaurants, and storefronts, as well as parks, plazas, and the street itself. I
also witnessed numerous protests, youth practices, and had countless informal
conversations covering topics from Argentina and politics to COVID-19 and how life has
been fundamentally changed since the onset of the pandemic.
This thesis contains four chapters. Chapter 1 is a literature review. This discusses
the scholarship on: 1) the contemporary political economy of Argentina; 2) the public
health situation in Argentina; 3) COVID-19 in Argentina; and 4) national protest
culture. Chapter 2 examines the political, economic, and public health policies pursued
by the Macri and Fernández administrations. This chapter draws upon economic
statistics and public health data in addition to public government statements. Chapter 3
focuses on protests and activism in Córdoba as a response to the failures of the
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government. This relies on participation observation conducted in Córdoba in 2020 and
data collected from observations and encounters with protests, as well as photos, videos,
and media accounts. Chapter 4 explores the political responses of youth society in
Córdoba. The data for this chapter comes from participant observation and interview
conducted with young Cordobenses.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
In this literature review, I begin with an overview of the modern Argentine
political economy focusing on events and policies essential to understanding the current
landscape. Next, I examine the public health system, its political influencers, and the
current health insurance system. The subsequent section offers background on
COVID-19, and a brief overview of its impact in Argentina. Finally, I discuss Argentina’s
storied protest culture, highlighting key events and their lasting influence, as well as
contributions to Argentina’s democracy.

Political Economy
Carlos Menem served as the president of Argentina from 1989 until 1999 as a
member of the Justicialist or Peronist Party. Menemism, the term coined to describe his
political approach, is a conservative platform (Calvo 2012: 157), and defined by its
neoliberal approach (Stefanoni 2019: 225), with an aggressive stance to tackling the
hyperinflation and chronic instability. Four key principles that defined Menem's
neoliberal approach included trade liberalization, privatization, labor reforms, and
financialization. This led to the weakening of the social safety net and deregulation of
the labor market, resulting in lower wages (Wylde 2016: 8-9). His actions rang true to
his 1991 declaration that redirecting Argentina into stability would be “a tough, costly,
and severe adjustment’, requiring ‘major surgery without anesthesia’” (Wylde 2016: 8).
Menem’s rise to power in the wake of an economic collapse gave him strategic
negotiating powers that permitted him to achieve his desired economic goals to further
the neoliberal agenda. Decentralization shifted many responsibilities to the provinces,
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like education and healthcare, with an execution strategy that forced provinces to align
with the national government in order to receive funding. Though ending
hyperinflation, Menem’s market reform strategy strategy would backfire, resulting in
growing unemployment, poverty, and income inequality. His administration set the
stage for the largest economic collapse in Argentine history in 2001 (Levitsky 2003:
152).
The years 1999-2003 are an exceptional time marked by economic collapse and a
revolving door of presidents — Fernando de la Rúa, Ramon Puerta, Eduardo Camaño,
Adolfo Rodríguez Sa, and finally, Eduardo Duhalde, who arranged for the subsequent
democratic election. Though recession began in 1998, it would not reach its height until
the convertabilidad, an economic policy that pegged the Argentine peso to the US
dollar, thus draining the national cash reserves, was undone and the peso decreased by
nearly 70% (Levitsky 2003: 155) in a matter of weeks. This disastrous policy decision,
along with the massive national debt accrued under Menem, and reduction in taxes
resulted in a 25% unemployment rate, and more than half of all Argentinians living in
poverty in 2002 (Levitsky 2003: 155). This legacy remains with the Argentine people, as
many still look to foreign markets for wealth and savings security, constantly aware of
the precariousness of hyperinflation and instability.
The 2003 election of center-left Peronist Néstor Kirchner pushed Argentina onto
a new course. Kirchner was widely successful, economically and socially, brokering debt
reduction with foreign creditors, putting policies in place that led to a 70% increase in
real wages, and overhauling the Supreme Court. This led to the annulment of laws
limiting persecution of human rights violations by the 1976-83 dictatorial regime
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(Levitsky 2008: 17-18). Conversely, his presidency is also remembered for concentrating
executive power. Kirchner issued 232 executive decrees during his tenure and
established provincial reliance on federal fiscal transfers (Levitsky 2008: 19). The
Kirchner administration put in place a new development approach called neodevelopmentalism that rejected neoliberalism and embraced stronger state control of
the economy and an emphasis on agricultural exports (Mendoza 2018).
Succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in 2007, Kirchnerism
continued and grew into a distinct political tradition (Mendoza 2018). Whereas Nestor
Kirchner’s economic policies were supported by a global commodities boom that
permitted the expansion of social programs, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was less
successful. Her administration’s attempt to raise agricultural export taxes in 2008
dramatically backfired, resulting in massive protests and a battle with the media.
Midterm elections resulted in massive party loses (Calvo 2012: 155). However, the
continued commodity boom and the lack of a true opposition front led to her reelection
in 2011. The subsequent drop in commodity prices resulted in cuts to subsidy programs,
and growing redistributionist policies. Inflation grew sharply but was intentionally
manipulating downward by administration meddling in the INDEC economic statistics
office of the federal government (Calvo 2012: 157-159). In 2015, Fernández de Kirchner’s
chosen candidate, Daniel Scioli, lost to the center-right candidate, Mauricio Macri. The
struggling economy was then handed over to a non-Peronist candidate for the first time
in decades.
Mauricio Macri appealed to conservatives and anti-Peronist voters, particularly
the alienated middle class that did not reap equal benefits from social spending
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programs implemented under Kirchnerism. His single term began with promise, before
falling victim to economic forces — the peso waned, the comfortable middle class lost
purchasing power, poverty and unemployment rose, and real wages declined. He was
defeated in 2019 by the ‘Frente de Todos’ Peronist ticket that ran Alberto Fernández
with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as his running mate. These two presidencies will be
discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

Public Health
The Argentine healthcare system in the most fragmented in Latin America
(Bernal 2019: 29), following a decentralization that took place largely under Menem in
the 1990s. The transition was abrupt, poorly planned, underfunded, resulting in a
massive variance from province to province as well as between municipalities across the
country. The federalist political system affords each province with great powers of selfdetermination. However, many provinces shifted the burden of directing the healthcare
sector onto municipalities. The healthcare infrastructure thus varies widely: poorer
provinces and rural areas are faced with shortages of medical personnel, whereas richer
zones and metropolitan areas have sufficient medical providers. The lack of adequate
access to healthcare perpetuates an underestimation of existing health problems and
overestimation of an individual’s overall health, reinforcing the correlation between
poverty and morbidity (De Maio 2007: 287).
The public health system is shaped by political influence. Each province is
regulated by a Minister of Health without national oversight or coordination, which,
when paired with a system established on insufficient funding, leaves the healthcare
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system reliant on governal leadership (Bernal 2019). However, a 2019 study reviewing
mayoral alignments and healthcare provisions in the Conurbano — the densely
populated municipalities surrounding the City of Buenos Aires — since the 1980s found
that communities with mayors who did not align with the governor had superior health
services compared to those in alignment (Garay 2019). Mayoral alignment resulted in
weakened healthcare infrastructure and lower healthcare funding. Due to the automatic
provincial transfers associated with providing healthcare services, non aligned mayors
rely on these to build political coalitions through strong health services (Garay 2019).
Those mayors who rely on the patronage networks that come from alignment tend to
govern municipalities with higher poverty rates (Garay 2019: 107).
The health insurance system has three different types of coverage: [fill in the
blank here]. Due to decentralization, underfunding, and the rise of private insurance,
there are some groups with double coverage while others are insufficiently insured. The
tri-part system is further subdivided, and varies between provinces, resulting in
inefficient risk pooling and variable degrees of coverage. Publicly funded healthcare is
primarily comprised of those not eligible for other programs, namely the impoverished
or members of the informal sector. Social health insurance accounts for 54% of the
population (Cavagnero 2010: 5). These plans—and what they cover—are negotiated by
unions. Private insurance, viewed as the highest quality option, is made up of those who
can afford to buy-in. Receiving subsidized healthcare is increasingly difficult, as
healthcare services are underfunded and subsidization requests are denied at higher
rates.
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The current public health situation in Argentina is juggling the desire for private
and universal options. The drastic changes from administration to administration has
created policy inconsistencies in funding, access, and coverage.

COVID-19
SARS-CoV-2, better known as COVID-19, is a novel coronavirus that arose in
Wuhan, China and became a global pandemic—this was declared by the World Health
Organization on March 11th, 2020 (Tagliazucchi 2020: 1). It most commonly manifests
as a respiratory syndrome, with many general symptoms overlapping with influenza;
upon infection, the virus attacks the respiratory system causing general discomfort,
cough, fever, difficulty breathing, and in advancing cases pneumonia, dyspnea, and even
death (Russo 2020: 347). Since the beginning of the pandemic, there have been more
than 132,000,000 confirmed cases and over 2,880,000 deaths (WHO 2021: 1). Impact
varies around the globe, but as the virus has progressively spread, the Americas have
been hit the hardest, accounting for more than 57,000,000 confirmed cases and
1,384,000 confirmed deaths as of April 2021 (WHO 2021: 1). Myriad containment
strategies have been implemented, from complete lockdowns in effected regions of
China to virtual non-action in Brazil. Other nations have balanced quarantines, social
distancing, and obligatory mask use. Success is impacted by political, social, economic,
and public health factors, making a universal strategy impossible, and leaving higherrisk populations vulnerable to strategic failures within and across borders.
The first case of COVID-19 in Argentina was confirmed on March 3rd in Buenos
Aires, and a complete lockdown was declared, beginning at 0:00 on March 20th. The
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national reaction was swift and aggressive, sealing the national and provincial borders,
grounding all flights, closing all businesses except grocery stores and pharmacies, and
restricting movement with police checkpoints on major thoroughfares and within
metropolitan areas. The initial rise in cases slowly decreased with time, before the
national quarantine mandate expired on April 26th, after which provinces with lower
case numbers began to relax measures, and densely populated or highly infected areas
remained under strict measures (Tagliazucchi 2020: 3). The Buenos Aires Metropolitan
Area (AMBA), composed of the province of Buenos Aires and the Autonomous City of
Buenos Aires, holds the lion-share of cases, in addition to the highest population
density. Reported cases have risen steeply since reopening measures began, particularly
accelerating through the months of August in September. In response, the government
has reimplemented many lockdown measures in areas with declining hospital
capacities.
The impacts of Argentina’s stringent measures, which endured for more than 100
days in many places, range from drastic economic fallout to psychological effects related
to lockdown. Business shutdowns led to thousands of permanent closures and loss of
employment, disrupting both the formal and informal sectors, and leaving many in
newfound or worsening poverty and mounting food and housing insecurity (Alzúa
2020). Social distancing and isolation led to widespread mental and physical health
declines, as well as a rise in reports of domestic violence and resulting deaths (Polischuk
2020). Assistance services vary greatly from province to province, and between
municipalities themselves, leaving many without options or relief. The psychological
stress caused by fear-oriented media has also led to behavioral and social fallout, as
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collective interest is exhausted, misinformation grows, and apathy takes over for some,
leading to polarization (Bavel 2020).

Argentina’s Protest Culture
A critical extension of the democratic system, protest culture in Argentina is built
upon tradition and memory, as demonstrations utilize a wide array of tactics to invoke
emotion, displaying intention, and incite change. Over the last thirty years, major
protests present different sets of tactics—the political repertoire that is available to
activists (Fuentes 2012: 463). Through collective action, political actors command
national attention, influence the government, and transform their own social identities
(Wolff 207: 7). From the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo protesting the disappearance of
their children under the dictatorship (1976-1983) to the protests against COVID-19
restrictions, protestors draw upon a diverse set of tactics to create national solidarity
and work to change existing conditions (Wolff 2007:9; Fuentes 2012:452; Lapenga
2015:73).
One major protest form is the cacerolazo. Cacerolazos involve the banging of
empty pots and pans in the streets. This is disruptive due to the noise, grabs public
attention, and directs it to the symbolism of empty pots and pans. The first cacerolazo
erupted spontaneously with the economic collapse in 2001, symbolic of the empty
dishes of the people as their currency devalued due to the unpegging of the Argentine
peso from the US dollar, and the corralito that limited the amount of money that could
be withdrawn from banks (Epstein 2003: 6). The impact of this crisis was not just on the
poor and working classes, but also on the middle class (Villalón 2002: 91). Since its
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inception, the cacerolazo has been a tool utilized beyond the framework of a political
party or union, expressing discontent. The simple protest tools (pots and pans) give it
universal accessibility to all demographics. It also has a deep resonance and ingrained
meaning associated with the banging of empty pots and pans because there is nothing to
be put in them (Villalón 2002: 91).
Another key protest form is associated with the piqueteros. The piquetero
phenomenon grew to prominence in the mid-1990s. Piqueteros are known for the ‘corta
de ruta’ (Lapenga 2015: 2) in which participants organize and block roads to put
pressure on the government and raise awareness for their particular issue (Wolff 2007:
7). These early actions against the neoliberal Menem administration involved drawing
attention to unemployment and the failure of the center-right Peronist party politics at
the time (Villalón 107, Lapenga 2015: 71, Epstein 2003: 4). Beginning with a blockade of
National Route 22 following a layoff from a YPF oil facility, the piqueteros become
synonymous with the unemployed and the workers’ movement (Epstein 2003: 2, Wolff
2007: 6). This protest style was so effective at paralyzing parts of the country that
provincial and federal administrations attempted to incorporate the demands of
activists into their platforms. The center-left Kirchner government developed social
programs to address some their concerns.
A very different movement erupted in 2008 regarding export taxes on farming
commodities. This movement of farmers—small, medium, and large—used the tactics of
the piqueteros but had a different political orientation. In 2008, the global price of soy
was high. The Fernández de Kirchner administration moed to raise the retenciones —
export taxes on soy. A coalition of farmers utilized the roadblock strategies to protest the
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tax increase (Lapenga 2015: 76). During this dispute, the historically fragmented
agricultural sector united against government tax increases that were intended to be
used to fund redistribution efforts related to social programs (Richardson 2009: 231;
Mangonnet 2020: 1228). The movement was successful and forced President Fernández
de Kirchner to retract the retenciones increase.
There is also the opportunity for symbolic performances that protest existing
government policies. The Plaza del Maya protesters used white scarves during the harsh
dictatorship-era. Mothers and grandmother silently walked around the Plaza de Mayo
outside of the Casa Rosada protesting government violence against dissidents. These
scarves then reappeared during the movement to legalize abortion. These ‘protest
performances’ (Fuentes 2012: 450) use aesthetics and symbolism to create meaning
among onlookers (Fuentes 2012: 459). Symbolic performances may also be semicomedic or absurd, most notably an instance of a family taking their summer vacation to
the bank, equipped with beach chairs, towels, and bathing suits, to express their
discontent with the corralito. The family physically represented the invasion of their
personal property by the bank (and government), which was felt by much of the middle
class. This ‘active appropriation of space’ (Fuentes 2012: 456) reinforces the idea that
protests and movements seek to inspire participation, disrupt specific patterns, or
invoke memory (Villalón 2002: 42, Fuentes 2012: 451).

Conclusion
In this literature review I establish the foundation for the current triple crisis —
politically, economically, and regarding public health. I also discuss traditional response
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methods, namely protests, as a means of democratic participation and holding the
government accountable. In this thesis I am to contribute the first study of youth protest
and everyday subversion in Córdoba, Argentina during the pandemic based on
participant observation and interviews.
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Chapter 2: The Triple Crisis
Introduction
This chapter examines the emergences of a triple crisis with political, economic,
and public health dimensions. It begins with a look at the Macri administration and the
economic turmoil that ensued in the second half of his term, leading to a massive rise in
inflation and an IMF emergency loan. It then examines the onset of the pandemic and
the public health emergency this created. Finally, it investigates the Fernández
government and the interaction between political, health, and economic problems. This
chapter argues that the trifold scope of Argentina’s current crisis — political legitimacy
questioned following neoliberal failures under Macri and inherited by Fernández, a preexisting recession further intensified by the impacts of COVID, and the pandemic
induced public health crisis. This chapter offers context for disillusionment as mistrust
was fostered on multiple fronts, each contributing to the worsening of the others. To do
this, this chapter methodologically draws on data from INDEC, CAME, WHO, and the
IMF, as well as government public health decrees and statements.

The Economy Under Macri (2015-2019)
Following the economic collapse at the turn of the millennium1 , the Argentine
economy has remained on precarious footing, with investors wary and quick to panic.
The administration of Mauricio Macri proved to be no different, unfolding as a tale of
two halves. The first two years of his term — 2016 and 2017 — saw prosperity and signs

1

Beginning in 1998, Argentina fell into an economic depression that would last until 2002,
resulting in massive nationwide protests in 2001 following a default on $132 million USD of
debt which sent more than half of the population into poverty.
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of growth under his ‘gradualistic’ (Sturzenegger 2019: 1) or slow transition back to a
neoliberal economic model. The second two years—2018 and 2019—were marked by
policy failure. Macri’s policies ultimately led to a deepening recession, the flight of
investors, and the turn toward the IMF. The Argentine people too lost trust in the
administration, visible in the primary presidential elections which opponent Alberto
Fernández won handily, by nearly 16 percentage points (Gedan 2019: 1). This sparked
an even larger investor exodus for fear of the return of Peronism to the Casa Rosada,
which became a reality a few weeks later.
Macri’s economic plan began by enacting several policy changes that served as
central tenants of his administration on the campaign trail, particularly involving
taxation. Key pillars include “Workers are not going to pay income taxes2” and the
“Reduction and elimination of export duties, opening of exports and elimination of ROE
(Registry of Sworn Declarations of Foreign Sales), general reduction of the levels of
effective tax pressure and creation of the Ministry of Agroindustry3”. The administration
immediately sought out income, corporate, and export tax cuts, all key pieces to market
liberalization. A platform that garnered support in the agrarian provinces, Macri rolled
back retenciones — export taxes, in this case specifically for agricultural products — to
fractions of those imposed under the previous Peronist administration. Wheat, corn,
and sunflower retenciones were eliminated, and soy, the nation’s most profitable

2

“Los trabajadores no van a pagar [el] impuesto a las Ganancias” (“Las 20 Promesas De
Campana De Mauricio Macri.” Clarín)
3

Reducción y eliminación de los derechos de exportación, apertura de las exportaciones y
eliminaciones de los ROE (Registro de Declaraciones Juradas de Ventas al Exterior), reducción
general de los niveles de presión tributaria efectiva y creación del Ministerio de Agroindustria
(“Macri prometió "eliminar las retenciones a las exportaciones" si gana las elecciones en 2015.”
Infobae)
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agricultural product, saw a drop in retenciones from 35% to 30% (Slipczuk 2020). These
retenciones had long been used to manage fiscal deficits, particularly during the soy
boom in 2008, in which higher global market prices allowed soy production to fund the
expansion of many social programs under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Wylde 2010:
11). Finally, Macri lifted currency controls to create a ‘floating currency’, based on
market supply and demand rather than a set government exchange rate This led to the
devaluation of the peso, making Argentine products, especially agricultural goods, more
competitive in the global market.
These tax cut and liberalization policies expanded the fiscal deficit. Macri took
steps to remedy the shortfall through austerity measures. First, there were cuts to
government subsidies for energy and transportation, which greatly contributed to the
deficit — which reached 6.3% of the national GDP by 2017 (IMF 2017), but had helped
protect reals wages for the lower and working classes. To meet fiscal shortfalls, Macri
turned to borrowing while the Argentine economy went through the process of
liberalization. To attract foreign capital, the Argentine government had to deal with
holdout vulture funds that had refused to restructure bonds related to the debt default
of 2001. Macri decided to pay off the vulture funds to the tune of $4.65 billion (Blitzer
2016: 1). Macri’s strategies showed success initially: inflation dropped to 17% by 2017
after spending a decade fluctuating between 25% and 40% (Kovalski 2019: 4) and his
party secured sweeping midterm election wins in the legislature.
The Macri administration’s neoliberal reforms seemed to be achieving the desired
goals of decreasing inflation, diminishing public spending, improving GDP, shrinking
poverty, and restructuring the economy toward financialization. According to
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Sturzenegger (2019), a former central banker (2015-2018) in Argentina, the Macri
administration was too successful. Feeling secure in his post-midterm power, Macri
sided with the Treasury to pressure the Central Bank into increasing inflation targets:
keeping inflation from lowering as quickly as projected by lowering interest rates. This
aimed to reduced government spending on pensions, which were a significant
contributor to the deficit and could only be readjusted with respect to inflation every
three months4. However, the Central Bank is understood to be an entity autonomous
from the government, despite this not being legally defined. Though investors knew that
the former Kirchnerist administrations had influenced the Central Bank, the credibility
of the Macri administration—as a neoliberal—turned on maintaining the institution’s
neutrality. Macri’s move created a legitimacy crisis for the institution. This incited
investor panic and led to a massive reduction in foreign investment. As investors and
dollars fled Argentine markets, the peso rapidly devalued, and inflation increased
(Sturzenegger 2019). By linking growth to foreign investment attracted by liberalization,
the Macri administration was put in a difficult spot once foreign investors fled. To head
off default, the government once again—like the previous neoliberal administration of
Menem—turned to the IMF, this time for a $57 billion loan, the largest in the
organization’s history. It also increased austerity measures, reintroduced retenciones,
and raising interest rates to 60% — the highest in the world at the time, during the
second half of 2018 (IMF 2019).

4

Pensions make up a significant government expenditure — 7.4% of GDP and 35% of total
government spending in 2015. Macri enacted a law in which every 3 months pensions would be
modified based on the inflation rate. By slowing the disinflation rate, he would improve the
condition of the growing fiscal deficit (MECON 2015) (Dudine 2016).
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Figure 1 -Argentine Economic Data from World Development Indicator

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Use of IMF credit (DOD, current
US$)

2,799,231,196.70

2,715,603,927.60

2,876,808,116.40

30,922,512,047.70

46,924,457,621.20

Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (BoP, current US$)

11,758,994,011.30

3,260,164,341.80

11,516,861,462.30

11,872,856,662.80

6,663,062,112.00

GDP (current US$)

594,749,285,413.20

557,531,376,218.00

642,695,864,756.40

519,871,519,807.80

449,663,446,954.10

GDP growth (annual %)

2.7

-2.1

2.7

-2.5

-2.2

GDP per capita (current US$)

13,789.10

12,790.20

14,591.90

11,683.90

10,006.10

The final nail in the administration’s coffin came in 2019’s primary elections,
essentially a mock run of the presidential election shortly after, in which competitor
Alberto Fernández handily defeated Macri. Economic hardships are not uncommon, but
the severity of the situation forced Macri to backslide on major campaign promises,
namely on retenciones, which weakened support among his voting base. His policies
alienated lower and working class Argentines; retenciones were crucial to keeping
domestic food prices low and subsidy cuts to basic necessities like utilities led to
growing struggles for lower-income brackets. Additionally, food insecurity grew and the
cost of living increased 5. Finally, Argentine skepticism towards the IMF is well known
following the organization’s perceived role in the 2001-2002 economic crisis that forced
millions into poverty and left nearly 1 in 5 unemployed (MacEwan 2014). In addition to
these shortcomings, the Peronists united behind the Frente de Todos ticket of Alberto
Fernández, as the presidential candidate, with former president Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner, as vice presidential candidate. The Fernández-Fernández ticket ultimately
won and ushered in a new era in Argentina politics. The neoliberal experiment ended

5

Export oriented populism, utilities from somewhere
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after just one term, with a 3.4% decrease in GDP, inflation rates between 240 and 300%,
a 10% decrease in per capita income, and rising poverty rates from 2015 to 2019
(Kovalski 2019).

Coronavirus in Argentina
Argentina has been in a recession since 2018 and entering 2020 the IMF forecast
an 11.8% contraction in the national GDP (Iglesias 2020). The arrival of the COVID-19
virus turned an already bleak economic outlook into an emergency, as governmentmandated closures and restrictions led to the closure of businesses and ground the
economy, and life, to a screeching halt.
The first case of COVID-19, a middle-aged man returning from Milan, Italy, was
reported on March 3rd in Buenos Aires. Over the next few days, more cases appeared in
the capital and other cities around the country. On March 11th, a 14-day mandatory
quarantine was enacted for all people entering the country from highly affected regions,
including China, the United States, and all of Europe. As reports of community
transmission began, President Fernández declared a nationwide lockdown commencing
on March 20th (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020) . The aggressive response was
widely heralded, particularly as case numbers were skyrocketing in other parts of the
world. All non-essential movement was restricted: all flights were grounded, national
and provincial borders were closed, movement within provinces and cities was
monitored by police checkpoints, all non-essential businesses were shuttered, masks
were made mandatory, and the population was only permitted to leave their homes for
necessities. Other than small exceptions for essential employees, these restrictions were
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applied universally and would endure until mid-April when slight regional flexibilities,
like leaving the home for walks and exercise, would commence in sparsely populated
areas (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020).
The relaxation of national restrictions was slow-moving, and provinces were
afforded the power to reinstate regulations to manage specific outbreaks. The city and
province of Buenos Aires remained under the strictest restrictions, suffering from the
overwhelming majority of cases for much of the pandemic. The metropolitan area faced
several periods of increased restriction for growing case numbers.
Government decisions have been perceived as inconsistent in some cases. The
lockdown was initially to last until March 31st but was extended in two-week increments
multiple times. In Córdoba, the businesses allowed to reopen under limited capacities
and social distancing requirements seemed to occur at random. For example, bars and
restaurants were opened for in-person indoor and outdoor seating until midnight on
July 7th, whereas gyms were not allowed to reopen at any capacity until mid-August
(Viola 2020)(‘Reabren…’ 2020). Moreover, locations with few to no cases were subject
to strict lockdowns identical to those in the most impacted cities for weeks on end. This
began to generate popular beliefs that lockdown measures were an unnecessary strategy
and destroyed local economies. With each lockdown extension, the economic calamity
compounded (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020). This facilitated massive antilockdown and anti-government protests in major cities across the country, Córdoba
being no exception, particularly as case numbers continued to rise in spite of
preventative measures.
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(WHO 2020)

Despite the initial promise under strict lockdown, case numbers began to grow
with the loosened restrictions. Case numbers closed in on 1.5 million by the end of
November 2020 (WHO 2020), making the outbreak in Argentina one of the worst in the
world. Many families could no longer stay at home due to the declining peso and rising
unemployment, homelessness, and food insecurity. Economically precarious households
were forced to brave health risks in order to survive, particularly relying on the
unregulated informal sector to make ends meet.
The situation was bleak by the middle of 2020. By the height of the austral
winter, Argentina’s national GDP was projected to contract by 9.9% within the year
(IMF 2020), 40.9% of the country was in poverty, and 10.5% were considered indignant
(INDEC 2020). An estimated 60,000 small to medium-sized businesses have closed,
leaving anywhere from 600,000 to 800,000 people without jobs, contributing to a 16year high unemployment rate of 13.1% reported following the 2nd quarter of 2020
(CAME 2020). Larger businesses have also been greatly impacted, with many large
multinational corporations declaring their exit from the nation, including airlines and
manufacturing facilities.
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Fernández Government Responses (Late 2019-Present)
Since the beginning of Argentina’s strict lockdown measures, Fernández's
narrative has remained consistent, stating that the health of Argentina comes before all
else, economy or otherwise. During a March 23rd press conference, the president stated:
“Many have told me that I would destroy the economy with the quarantine. If the
dilemma is the economy or life, I choose life. Afterward, we will see how to order the
economy6”. As circumstances worsened and his popularity wained, many of his
interventionist tactics have been labeled as a catalyst for decline. The compromised state
of the government has provided an opportunity for conspiracy theories and speculative
narratives to develop7, fostering mistrust. As time has gone on, ‘choosing life’ no longer
seems to be an adequate response for some social groups. Fernández has worked to shift
the blame on his predecessor.

Poverty Rates 2016-2020
Poverty

Indignance

45.00%

40.9

40.00%
35.4
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35.5

32
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25.00%
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con la
8
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la vida. Después veremos cómo
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For example, there was a wave of conservative speculation that the government grounded all
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order to drive airlines out of the country to strengthen the state owned Aerolineas
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Figure 3 – Poverty Rates in Argentina (INDEC 2020)
Many of the measures taken by Fernández have come under fire. First and
foremost, Fernández has wielded extraordinary amounts of power for the duration of
the pandemic, due to Law 27.541, affording the executive a series of time-limited powers
(Gargella 2020). The law covers what can be designated as a public emergency, outlines
the realm of these powers, including economic and fiscal matters, in addition to health
and social protections. This allowed Fernández to declare a ‘sanitary emergency’ in the
wake of COVID-19, with these powers extendeding for one year (Gargella 2020). The
majority of Argentina’s response to the pandemic relies on a series of emergency
decrees, making many, particularly opponents to the current administration, critical of
sustained overreach. Many of these decrees are aimed at maintaining productions of
essential goods, financial assistance measures for families, businesses, and provinces;
price freezes and maximums on essential supplies; and the construction of twelve
emergency hospitals (Gargella 2020). Nonetheless, as the pandemic continues to unfold,
the coercive forces of the state are being called into question through protest
mobilizations and daily rhetoric in Córdoba. Federal measures do not equally assist or
impact the population in the wake of growing poverty and economic precariousness, at
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times putting at-risk populations in greater danger, and leaving many without necessary
aid8 .
The ‘Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia', a 10,000 peso government aid package
available to unemployed and informal workers, paid out three times in April, June, and
August, has been one of the main sources of government support, particularly in the
early months of restrictions. Based on the official conversion rate, this is equivalent to
roughly $140-$150 USD, though the unofficial ‘Blue Dollar’ rate of roughly 190 pesos
per USD reduces this value significantly. To put this into perspective, a COVID-19 test
for an uninsured person — 36% of the population (Pan American Health Organization
2017) — is 5,200 pesos9. Given high unemployment and the meagerness of this
program, many are trapped in a situation of limited opportunities. Indeed, a growing
percentage of the population has been pushed into poverty and indigence (see Figure 3
above). This has generated a political crisis that is enmeshed in the public health and
economic crises. The use of emergency powers of the presidency and declining
conditions of living, employment, health, and well-being have left the Fernández
administration in a political precarious position.

8

Lower-income households, particularly those living in what are classified as slums or villas,
has been disproportionately impacted due to overcrowded living conditions. During an outbreak
in a villa outside of Buenos Aires — Villa Azul — was blocked off by police to prevent spread
outside the community, trapping residents inside, with little access to public services. 3 million
people live in villas in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. (Hoffman 2020)
9

As previously discussed, low-income, uninsured citizens can apply for government
subsidization of medical costs, however, given the current state of the healthcare system and
competitive relationship between public and private medical care facilities, these subsidy
requests are being rejected at growing rates.
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The economy Fernández inherited was operating at a substantial deficit prepandemic. With the added expenses of emergency funds for struggling families and
businesses, as well as looming negotiations with the IMF regarding paying back the debt
incurred under Macri, the government needs more capital to close this gap, and more
pesos in circulation to keep businesses from folding. Peronism in its current form is
largely identifiable through its maintenance and expansion of social and welfare
programs. Tax increases were approved before the pandemic, but a one-off capital levy
or ‘wealth tax’ aimed specifically at Argentines with more than 2 million USD in assets,
in addition to increases in retenciones have been the most drastic taxation policies
undertaken thus far (O’Boyle 2020). To assist with access to capital, Fernandez has
required that banks lend out 320 billion pesos at a reduced interest rate of 24%
compared to the Central Bank rate of 38% (Comte 2020). This infringement on the
autonomy of the Central Bank has concerned many, particularly as this pushes the
previous ‘floating currency’ into the situation of a ‘dirty’ floating currency, or one that is
being manipulated by government measures.
For many in Córdoba, neither saving the economy nor saving lives have been
viable tactics, since this has left millions without work, without health, and without
options. The anti-government mantra ‘Que se vayan todos’, famously utilized during the
economic crisis of the early 2000s, has returned to the streets in many places. However,
the real damage is located with those who have lost faith in their nation, and have
determined that it is they themselves who must leave this time, in one capacity or
another. With disintegrating hopes for the future, many are moving assets outside of
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Argentina, while others hope they will soon follow, relocating to countries they deem to
have greater opportunities.

Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Argentina faced a triple crisis related to politics,
economy, and public health in 2020. The discussion has examined the policies put in
place by the neoliberal Macri government to liberalize the economy and the damage this
eventually caused, resulting in rising inflation, poverty, devaluation, and the need for a
massive IMF loan. The discussion has also focused on the Fernández administration and
the protocols put in place to contain the COVID outbreak, deal with the fallout from the
economy, and begin to overcome the recession and worsening poverty. However, the
Fernández government’s use of emergency powers and failure to reverse the economic
and public health crises has led to the delegitimization of the political system.
Beginning with issues of government legitimacy caused by the Macri
administration, economic precariousness placed many in circumstances highly
susceptible to the ensuing COVID-19 pandemic. Rising case numbers despite strict
government protocols, the inability of many to survive without returning to some form
of work, and panic fatigue compounded to further call political legitimacy int oquestion.
Because of this cyclical compounding, the people of Córdoba returned to traditional
structures like protest and subversion to air grievances and regain the sense of normalcy
the government was failing to provide.

!34
Chapter 3: Córdoba’s 2020 Protests
Introduction
Argentine society is entering a phase of restructuring. The pandemic has ushered
in a new generation-defining catastrophe, and the people of Córdoba have worked to
address these issues through protest. This chapter examines the emergence of protests
in the city of Córdoba during 2020 in response to the triple crisis of political, economic,
and public health conditions. The chapter argues that early protests were marked by
activism ‘on wheels’ — appropriation of public spaces utilizing cars, and mild subversion
through the breaking of lockdown measures. Later protests, however, were
characterized by increasingly subversive tactics, disregarding social distancing and other
health protocols to draw greater attention to particular protest messages about a wide
range of issues. This chapter methodologically draws upon informal interviews, media
coverage, and participant observation in Córdoba over the year as a first-hand witness of
the COVID-19 outbreak in Argentina as well as the political, economic, and health
impacts it generated.

Early to Mid 2020 Protests
Protesting and mobilization are critical components of Argentine democracy.
This is recognized by the government and citizens alike, and is a reflection of a healthy
political system in which movements are a key check on government power. As protests
started in Córdoba in a modified capacity, this symbolized a return to normalcy through
the reclaiming of the streets as an extension of the democratic process.
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The city of Córdoba maintained strict lockdown requirements for months, but
this did not stop protests from taking place within the city. Adapting to health and safety
concerns, activists quickly devised new strategies to convey their platforms to the wider
population. Protests within the city tend to follow a generic pattern (see Figure 4 below).
Protestors will congregate at the centrally located Patio Olmos, a shopping center that
sits in front of a roundabout where three major roads intersect. This open area, located
in a highly frequented sector of the city, abuts several other small plazas, allowing for
large congregations that are highly visible. These central spaces and intersections allow
protestors to easily disrupt the circulation of traffic and to draw the attention of people
walking through these zones and living in these neighborhoods. Parts of these roads
may be entirely shut down if the group grows large enough, with casual participants
driving by typically playing cuarteto music — a genre originating in Córdoba — and
honking, often with signs carrying the movement’s slogans. While many protests are
contained in this specific area, others will begin a few blocks away near the city’s central
plaza and migrate to Patio Olmos, continuing up Avenida Hipolito Irigoyen towards a
second large plaza — Plaza España — where five roads intersect in another large
roundabout. Protests are common and highly sociable events, rapidly expanding in a
matter of hours through word of mouth, social media, or stumbling upon an event, with
growing numbers further enticing communal congregation. As such, this spirit of
demonstration could not be quelled by social distancing orders, particularly as issues
began to compound, resulting in protests expressing discontent with a specific problem
but also systematically undermining government COVID protocols to enhance protest
performances.
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Early protests following the imposition the lockdown set the tone for the
emergence of a new facet of Argentine protest culture related to public health protocol
subversion, albeit gradually at first. These movements theoretically adhered to protocols
for COVID-19 by taking place in cars; however, even this undermined core government
tenants as citizens were prohibited from leaving their homes except to purchase basic
necessities. Though adhering to some public health measures, the protests also
communicated the sentiment of overruling government decisions, adding a level of
credibility to the cause by subtly risking a pandemic to demonstrate on behalf of the
issue. Without traffic to obstruct, caravans of protestors drove slowly up main avenues,
honking, playing loud music, and disrupting the otherwise quiet city. Vehicles’ signs,
flags, and symbolism communicated support for causes ranging from union complaints
to free public education to issue-based protests like objection to national judicial
reforms. However, these protests lacked the presence and engagement of traditional
demonstrations based on a culture of large-scale disruption.

Figure 4 - Map of downtown Córdoba and typical pattern for mobile protests (Google Maps 2021)
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Anti-government sentiments dominated much of the protest rhetoric,
particularly as economic circumstances worsened, be that against provincial or federal
government, specific politicians, or policies. On May 29th, a large protest against
Córdoba’s Peronist Governor Juan Schiaretti took place, with vans toting a simple
printed message: “Schiaretti = La Peor10”. This movement, conducted by the Unión de
Educadores de la Provincia de Córdoba11 (UEPC), was aimed directly at the Governor’s
adjustments to retirement plans. It is difficult to distinguish demographics given that
the movement was entirely made up of people driving, but given that it took place
during the 10:00 and 11:00 hours on a Friday morning demonstrates that these
protestors did not have work obligations at this time—members of the informal lower or
working class sector would be reliant on working during this period of the day. The
vehicles were also indicative of middle- or upper-class income levels.
As community attitudes began to relax and the fear of the pandemic began to
dissipate following months of panic fatigue, demonstrations became more daring and
overt from a public health subversion perspective, but remained in line with collective
social ideals of taking the pandemic seriously so as to not alienate themselves from their
supporting base. Following the protest against his retirement plan modifications,
Governor Schiaretti made statements in support of protesting, with the stipulation of
also adhering to health and safety protocols. “You can never lose sight of the need to
take care of democracy … you cannot fall at risk of authoritarian attitudes12 ”. Schiaretti
10

Schiaretti = The Worst

11

Union of Educators of the Province of Córdoba

12

Nunca se puede perder de vista la necesidad de cuidar la democracia … no se puede caer en
riesgo de tener actitudes autoritarias. (“Schiaretti Dijo Que Hay Que ‘Garantizar’ La Protesta
Social, Pero ‘Sin Afectar Reglas Sanitarias.’”)
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would go on to urge other state actors to support these demonstrations, and to allow
them to function in a manner that would not pose a public health risk, likening this
permission to a situation of controlling chaos. “You have to understand these situations
[protests] … the State has to shepherd and guarantee them so that they can develop
without affecting sanitary rules13”. As discontent continued to grow, containing these
demonstrations would cease to be a possibility. Rhetoric became increasingly antigovernment, and displays further pushed the boundaries of pandemic protocols and
regulations.

Mid to Late 2020 Protests
The passage of time finally saw mild relaxations in COVID parameters within the
city, during which time frustrations with the government’s strict approach began to
receive increasing pushback. With the massive growth in unemployment, business
closures, and social insecurity, discontent increasingly began to manifest in
demonstrations. Whatever the main point of protest criticism, these movements
fundamentally aligned against the government through the subversion of COVID
regulations. Protest structurally shifted from a mission on wheels to a mixture of cars
and individuals on foot, once again relying on sound impact, adding drumming and
bullhorns to the arsenal, as well as firecrackers and colored smoke. Walking participants
grew in number through the winter, as did the overall size of protests. Despite social
distancing requirements, groups would physically gather, though nearly all wore masks.

13

Hay que entender esas situaciones …. el Estado tiene que encausarlas y garantizarlas para que
se puedan desarrollar sin afectar las reglas sanitarias (“Schiaretti Dijo Que Hay Que ‘Garantizar’
La Protesta Social, Pero ‘Sin Afectar Reglas Sanitarias.’”)
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By June, protests had returned to their original home outside of Patio Olmos, their
frequency increased and participant numbers growing. The use of moderate subversion
in these protests drew attention to their different causes, but without overshadowing the
protest’s actual purpose. The point was not to derail the intended protest message with a
digression into pandemic protocol.
On July 6th, 17 year old Valentino Blas Correas — Blas — was murdered by
a police officer when shots were fired into a car that did a U-turn to avoid a police
checkpoint, with bullets narrowly missing the other passengers. The social media outcry
was immediate, and the following evening a massive protest took place in the center of
Córdoba. The streets were packed with protestors, led by the victim’s family carrying a
sign reading ‘Justicia por Blas14’ that stretched the width of the avenue. Many donned tshirts with the same message, and other signs read ‘Ni una bala más, ni un Blas menos,
Justicia por Blas 15’. Despite thousands of demonstrators and a complete lack of social
distancing, there were no police in sight. The crowd primarily consisted of families and
young people. All wore masks, more or less correctly. This protest can be analyzed on
three levels. First, there is a call for justice and condemnation of police brutality.
Second, the rhetoric ‘ni un Blas menos’ alludes to another prominent Argentine social
movement — Ni Una Menos16. This grassroots feminist movement has campaigned
against gender-based violence, and spread across South America in recent years. Third,
there are clear subversive undertones visible in the lack of social distancing, refusing to
adhere to government requests in the face of a state-caused tragedy. These elements
14

‘Justice for Blas'

15

‘Not one bullet more, not one Blas less, justice for Blas’

16

Not one [woman] less’
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interplay to express public dissent, to link the demonstrations to another well-known
anti-violence movement, and intentionally disregard COVID protocols in a massive,
widely visible, and unregulated display.
Anti-government protests surrounding COVID-19 restrictions have drawn on
imagery and symbolism from the contemporary history of national protest. A protest on
September 19th utilized rhetoric centered on ‘libertad’. Demonstrators referenced the
2001 economic crisis slogan ‘Que se vayan todos’, while others aired specific grievances
like ‘basta de usar al senado como aguantadero17 ’, or ‘no a la reforma judicial.’ The
protests are nationalistic, the streets filling with supporters carrying Argentine flags, a
protest style known as banderazos (Aimar 2020). These events are highly inclusive: all
demographics can be witnessed, and vendors line the sidewalks selling Argentine flags
to passersby who wish to join. In addition to rhetoric referencing constitutional abuses
and abuses of power, this imagery used by protestors attempts to position participants
as the true representation of Argentina, as a patriotic force seeking to defend its
democracy and the will of the people. These demonstrations show how the people, as a
representative of the nation and protectors of democracy, will not silently permit
perceived abuses.
On October 12th, massive anti-government protests took place in cities across the
country, however Córdoba’s demonstration quickly evolved into a large-scale
participatory performance tailored to suit the culture of the city. Beginning as a protest
following predictable rhetoric against ongoing government policies and the waving of
the national flag, the event quickly morphed into a street party of thousands. This street

17

Stop using the Senate as a supporter
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party involved a crowd of young people, many without masks — an uncommon sight in
public spaces. Moreover, these street party protestors rebuffed social distancing as loud
electronic music, a genre intertwined with the city’s identity, blared. Electronic music
and rave culture are key elements to the culture of Córdoba, particularly as a youth
outlet — it is the sound of local nightlife, and the summer is dominated by electronic
festivals in fields and hangers outside the city. According to one participant:
It was actually a normal protest in one way — against the government, and on the other
hand, electronic party organizers supposedly "calling" to have a kind-of party there.18

These subversive actions by young people—violating social distancing and masking
protocols—are directly in contrast to government COVID-19 precautions, in addition to
being a display of local culture and youth frustrations. These young adults took the
streets to party in a way that had been taken from them for nearly nine months. By these
actions, young people are actively appropriating public space in protest for their youth
With their freedom to freely associate, gather, and in this case, party, stripped by
government protocols, they turned to traditional outlets and unexpected methods of
political subversion to voice discontent.

Conclusion
This chapter examines how protests emerged in Córdoba against the political, economic,
and public health crises during 2020. I argue that the protests began with a logic of a
mission ‘on wheels’ that violated the lockdown measures but maintained social
distancing and mask requirements, be that out of respect for government authority or
18

En realidad era una protesta normal en una parte contra el gobierno y en otra parte
organizadores de fiestas electronicas supuestamente "reclamando" hicieron tipo fiesta ahí
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fear of the virus. However, protest forms changed as the lockdown measures were
relaxed. Protests moved beyond car-based missions to include cars and walkers that
wore masks but violated social distancing measures. Finally, by late 2020, there were
protests—involving youth street parties—that violated social distancing and mask
protocols. This reflects the tactic of increasing subversion of public health rules to gain
public attention to protest a variety of issues.
Many of the underlying elements visible in the 2020 protests were not new, and
recycle tactics from the great political movements of the past. As protests expanded, the
deeply emotive aspects of these movements became exceedingly clear, drawing on
cultural forms of expression to speak in a uniquely Cordobesa voice with the
incorporation of regional elements like cuarteto music and youth rave culture.

!43
Chapter 4: Understanding Youth Perspectives
Introduction
This chapter examines youth protest in response to the multifaceted crisis in
Argentina. It offers a glimpse into the lived reality of young people in Córdoba as the
world they have known has been fundamentally altered, utilizing interviews and
participant observations from March until December 2020. Through this approach, I
examine reactions and rationalizations of changing social practices, understandings of
the government, and a new emerging youth consciousness as young people grapple with
uncertainty and what it means to be Argentine. This chapter argues that young adults
have embraced the politics of everyday subversion. Going beyond public protests, young
adults have sought to rebuild youth culture through appropriation of city spaces during
the day and at night in ways that challenge the legitimacy of government public health
protocols. Through these acts of everyday subversion, youth culture expresses a desire
for a return to the normalcy that this crisis has erased.

Social Life in Córdoba
A densely packed city dating back to early Spanish colonial rule and Jesuit
mission settlement in the late 16th century, Córdoba is a bustling concrete jungle
dominated by pedestrian foot traffic and public transit (Historia y Memoria). The city
contains a multitude of barrios — neighborhoods — each possessing a unique character
and community, making even adjacent barrios distinguishable. For this reason, a strong
‘barrio identity’ has developed — close, friendly relationships between neighbors, from
small talk at the lavandería (laundromat) to a first name basis with verdulería (vegetable
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store) employees to city street workers carrying groceries to a passerby’s apartment.
Cordobesas utilize public spaces as an extension of the home, even into the street, be
that by bringing chairs to sit outside of a kiosco (kiosk) or chatting on a curb — the city
is never quiet. Just as the street serves as a prominent space for socialization, municipal
public spaces act as an essential conduit for supra-barrio interactions that create urban
identification with and solidarity for Córdoba. Mate19, a traditional tea, is a key signifier
of national Argentine identity, in addition to being a quotidian social practice (Yerba
Mate Argentina). In the mid-afternoon, public spaces, from the open fields of Parque
Sarmiento20 to the open stairs and ledges surrounding the concrete fountain at Paseo
del Buen Pastor, contain friends and family sharing mate, cigarettes, and conversation,
pausing for community and reflection each day.
Youth social life in Córdoba is also defined by its nightlife. Urban nightlife
involves boliche21 culture, the previa 22, and the after component. In addition to
nightlife, there are social gatherings across networks of kin and friends and
acquaintances, including an early evening cervecito or an asado23, an Argentine
tradition of grilling often beginning in the afternoon and running well into the night.
Gastronomy is central to the community building process, inviting large groups to

19

A traditional South American tea with ritualistic communal drinking practices in which water
is poured over dried leaves, drunk out of a bombilla (explain) through a metal straw and passed
around a group
20

Parque Sarmineto is the largest public park in the city of Córdoba, located in the Nueva
Córdoba region of the city adjacent to the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
21

Argentine slang for a nightclub

22

Pregame
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gather on a terrace. Music and the scent of food cooking fill the air, as neighbors
convene groups that may spontaneously grow. Indeed, the urban cultural dynamics of
Córdoba revolve around the fundamental element of shared spaces: the street, parks,
open air markets, or central plazas. These shared spaces create physically proximity,
emotional warmth, and a sense of togetherness, intimacy, and solidarity.

The Pandemic and New Cultural Practices of Togetherness
The introduction of a new, deadly virus posed a threat to youth socialization
practices and cultural norms in Córdoba. A swift, total lockdown in a city dominated by
one-bedroom apartments left the chronically sociable society paralyzed, with
interactions strictly prohibited and the use of public spaces forbidden for months. Social
distancing measures reshaped everyday cultural norms and impacted a lively economic
sector based on entertainment. It eradicated traditional gatherings and customary
greeting practices. Gone were the days of a kiss on the cheek to each person in a room,
replaced instead with distant elbow bumps and maintaining a minimum one meter of
distance between all parties in any public setting. An early mask mandate was well
respected, particularly given the constant presence of police and military on the street,
standing guard on every corner. The nation and city’s public health approach in late
March and April cultivated palpable fear in early days when case numbers were in the
single digits. In this initial period of lockdown, everyday social interaction was sharply
curbed, leaving many lonely and alone, drastically impacting mental health, and
alienating community members from one another out of fear.
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New cultural practices began to appear that initially expressed solidarity with the
public health mandate. In the early days of lockdown, neighbors would bang pots and
pans, clapping and cheering in unison at 9:00pm each evening in support of healthcare
workers. There were stories of loud, socially distant parties between apartment
buildings, blaring loud music from speakers as people gathered on balconies. As the
days wore on and lockdown in Córdoba continued to be extended, a spirit of solidarity to
flatten the curve dissipated and was replaced with growing resentment and animosity
towards government protocol. As discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrations
began to grow. Also, covert subversion flourished. The government loosened public
health restrictions, and outings were permitted based on national ID number (DNI) and
corresponding week days, as well as restricted access to public spaces for exercise.
Fewer government regulations created spaces of opportunity, namely for
prohibited gatherings and manipulation of legal parameters. This was aided by lax law
enforcement approaches. Despite distancing measures and mask mandates, green
spaces became an open space of youthful subversion. This began with some people
exercising without a mask, followed by increasingly large groups gathering for mate or a
game of soccer. The reopening of the skate park within Parque Sarmiento in May
reignited the prevalent skating community within the shelter of a literal safe space —
surrounded by a tall fence, police, and monitoring authorities. However, the police
allowed free use of the space without regulation. Public and green spaces have always
functioned as gathering places and the lungs of the city, but, without other options, they
became the social lifeline for many residents.
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There was a performativity to public health regulation and caution at work in
Córdoba among the government and police. Lax enforcement by public authorities
created the performance or semblance of robust regulation that enabled citizens to
circumvent the rules and—in some cases—flout noncompliance. The relaxing of public
health rules led to case numbers skyrocketing and an infection rate among the highest in
the world. The initial lockdown quickly turned into a panic fatigue, with rising apathy
and the perception of minimal risk creating a false sense of security visible in
improperly worn masks and distancing policies in bars and restaurants that neglected
consideration of ventilation or a defined maximum capacity. Once more, lax policing
created the perfect structure for viral transmission. As Interviewee A remarked:
That's why I think that when they were relaxing [quarantine parameters] or yes they
were releasing people, raising the quarantine a little, they are not so strict, hey, well, no,
I suppose they couldn't measure - measure themselves rather well and they left and well
they caused the greatest amount of infections. 24

From their perspective, this interviewee saw rising case numbers to be the result of
relaxing restrictions, but as the fault of the people, who lacked the ability to adequately
judge the circumstances and restrain themselves to prevent the spread of the virus.
Lulled into a false sense of security, they underestimated the reality of the pandemic in
Argentina, taking advantage of leniencies as if the threat of COVID was no longer real.
Illegal parties began in late May and June, growing larger and more frequent
throughout the winter, and expanding even further with the return of summer. In early
months sneaking people into a household was difficult due to heavy street monitoring.
24

“Cuando fueron liberando o si liberando a la gente, levantando un poco la cuarentena que no
son tan estricta eh la gente bueno no, no supongo medir — medirse mas bien y se largó a salir y
bueno se causaron la mayor cantidad de los contagios”

!48
With time obvious loud music, shouting, and multicolored lights—all noticeable from
the street—rarely met with any police intervention. Secret gatherings —known as
clandestinos — could number anywhere from within the ten-person limit implemented
during the winter, to parties of fifty or more, with little to no repercussions, even if the
police were specifically alerted. These events were handled with simple warnings at the
front door without any further investigation, despite neighbors calling to report large
parties. Efforts to reinstate stringent measures were moot, particularly given that the
existing spread was the result of an already outlawed activity that was being perpetuated
discreetly, and actively ignored by the enforcing body.

Perspectives on the Government
Young Cordobenses articulated nuanced, ambivalent perspectives on the federal,
provincial, and municipal government. Though they dismissed government actions as
ineffective, performative, and economically harmful, young adults also recognized the
unprecedented nature of the pandemic and the attempts by government officials to keep
Argentines safe from a public health standpoint.
Young Cordobenses expressed various complaints about the federal government
related to COVID-19 management. These complaints introduced a new found agency
visible in social decision making. Individuals emphasized self-governance. Where a
single person openly understands the rationality behind COVID restrictions and
government actions, they simultaneously contradict this through electing to follow their
own personal guidelines instead, disregarding facets that they deem unnecessary or
burdensome. This manifests itself in a variety of manners, ranging from participating in
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illegal gatherings to wearing masks improperly in institutions that require them. In
response to asking if acting against government rules were a form of rebellion, one
participant answered:
Yes, obviously yes, totally. Apart from that, that is ... They [the government] did not do
things well ... I know that they are not doing well, I know that they will not be good, so
that is why doing what is prohibiting is not so bad ... they are prohibiting something that
really should not prohibit. 25

From this participant’s perspective, the Argentine government had not handled the
pandemic well, and because of this discredits the protocols and restrictions put in place.
In their opinion, the precautions are unnecessary, and as such, subject to being
circumvented based on personal discretion, introducing a degree of self-rule.
There were also critiques of the Fernández administration and the economic
outcomes of managing the pandemic. Young adults voiced significant frustrations with a
stalled economy, evaporating opportunities, and the psychological impact on the
youngest generation. Some stressed the inadequacy of the economic response from the
Fernández administration to the scale of the problem. The government developed a
stimulus and social welfare support policy designed to support workers, minimum wage
workers, and vulnerable groups, increase monetary transfers to poor families, and
ensure social security payments to lower income beneficiaries through a package worth
6.0% of the national GDP in 2020 (Policy Responses to COVID-19: Argentina). As such,
many families turned to government payments to make ends meet, and household

25

Si, obviamente si, totalmente. Aparte de eso o sea … No hicieron las cosas bien … se que no
están haciendo bien se que no van a ser bien por eso por ahi lo aquello esta prohibiendo no esta
tan mal que lo no se … lo que esta prohibiendo algo que realmente no debe prohibir.

!50
members searched for additional work to replace or supplement incomes. Young people
were faced with difficult decisions regarding the future. Interviewee F remarked:
The government gave an aid plan for people who did not have a job or at least a [formal]
job and they gave stimuluses of 10,000 pesos per month. I was able to collect just one
because you had to still be unemployed, so the following month I could not get paid
because I started working. But this does not seem like a good measure to me because it
was 10,000 pesos — in Argentina that is very little, and it was a single payment per
family. For a family , 10,000 pesos when you do not have a job and have two or three
children it’s impossible, I think they are not even eating26

The stipulations to qualify for government aid left many families in difficult financial
positions as business closures caused jobs to evaporate. This interview participant was
fortunate to find two part time jobs to supplement his family’s income as the small
business they owned suffered, in addition to being a full-time university student. With
little free time, Interviewee F’s grades suffered, and they often spoke of leaving the
country for better opportunities elsewhere, saving money in dollars to protect whatever
assets they were able to accumulate. There was no clear end or solution to repair the
state of the national economy, which diminished hope for the future.
Despite these critiques of the government, young Cordobenses also voiced more
ambivalent perspectives that recognized the difficulty for any administration to deal
with an unexpected situation of such magnitude. Interviewee B remarked:

26

“El gobierno dio un plan de ayuda para la gente que no tenía trabajo o por lo menos trabajo en
blanco y bueno dieron bonos de 10,000 pesos por mes yo pude cobrar un solo porque necesito
mantener no tiene trabajo pero después el mes siguiente no lo pude cobrar porque empecé a
trabajar. pero esto no me parece una buena medida porque era 10,000 pesos en Argentina es
muy poco y era un solo bono por familia y para una familia 10,000 pesos, cuando no tiene
trabajo y tiene dos hijos o tres es imposible creo que están ni comer.”
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I think the measures were justified in the first moment that they were taken because
well, as I said before, it is a very new situation, eh, very extraordinary, so well, we really
do not know what could work and what not ... When they started taking this type of
measure, at a time when people were tired and they needed to work, it's a bit unjustified.
Protocols could have be established and things would work a little more freely.27

This statement expresses some understanding of the legitimate public health risk and
how “extraordinary” the situation was. However, as the economic downturn accelerated,
the faults of the government were compounded as they recognized the need to adapt to
ensure that people could work and survive.
These anti-government perspectives facilitated the protests that began in late
May and contributed to the sense of illegitimacy and inadequacy of the political
leadership in Argentina. This political perspective fostered the spirit of subversion that
took hold in urban green spaces, public areas, and homes. The restoration of cultural
practices of everyday life—being together, drinking mate, dancing, playing music, and
nightlife—became the goal for this politics of resistance. The problem was that this
cultural restoration could not be achieved as people struggled to survive, worked odd
jobs, and had other concerns related to family, businesses, and education.

Forging a New Youth Consciousness in Córdoba
COVID-19 placed a critical role on the individual, relying on personal moral
obligation to close this gap between regulation and realistic policing capacities. This
27

Yo creo que las medidas eran justificado en su primer momento que se tomaron em porque
bueno como dije antes es una situación muy nueva eh muy extraordinaria, entonces bueno
realmente no sabemos que podías funcionar y que no… Ya cuando se empezaron a tomar este
tipo de medidas en un momento en cuando la gente estaba cansado necesitaran trabajar aye
bueno es un poco injustificado se podrían establecer protocolos y las cosas funcionarán un poco
mas libremente.
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brought about debates of communal obligation and Argentine society in general focused
on the issue of “consciousness” or “awareness” (conciencia).
On the level of health, I think it’s [COVID regulations] good because the Argentine
people don’t have a lot of consciousness about the cause — no one uses a mask, the
people look for , I don't know, social gatherings and the like… If we were another, more
conscious society things would be better… At least our society is a society that lacks
education and there are a lot of people that aren't conscientious about many things… In
other countries they can distinguish between what is bad and what is good. I think we
are a very irresponsible society. 28

This concept of consciousness is being discussed through an understanding of the direct
impact the choices of a single person can have on the wider community, resulting in a
multilevel understanding of culpability. The reality of public consciousness is far more
nuanced than protest propaganda; mobilizing against the government while masked
demonstrates that despite anger over management approaches, the individual is aware
of their role in the greater system.
The notion of self-governance results from a lack of belief in the government.
This is not a new phenomenon, and arguably a tenant of Argentine culture, particularly
visible in this case along generational boundaries due to the inherent risk and fear of
contracting the virus.
People if they want to get together, will meet… Most of the people, if they want to get
together, they want to do something they are going to do - that's the problem. You can

28

“Al nivel saludo creo que esta bien porque la gente argentino no — no tiene mucha conciencia
en la causa de nadie usa barbijo, la gente busca — no se — reuniones sociales y e igual … Si
fuéramos otra sociedad mas consiente mejor sería… Por lo menos nuestra sociedad es una
sociedad en que falta educación y hay mucha gente que no es consiente en muchas cosas … En
otros países puedan darse cuenta en que esta mala y que esta buena. Creo que estamos una
sociedad bastante inconsciente.”
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only control the way it’s done, that's why there are so many clandestine meetings [illegal
gatherings]. 29

Once more, this reenforces the notion of performativity, but from the perspective of the
individual as a subversive unit. Where counterculture was revolved around illegally
smoking marijuana in public, youth counterculture has taken on new forms related to
the art of evasion, circumventing roadblocks designed to prevent potential virusspreading movement, gathering in public spaces moments after police leave, and
hosting massive parties. Raising stakes and consequences also affords a heightened
degree of self-instilled power and intentionality. While individuals understand why
gatherings are prohibited, it is approached like an honor code system rather than a
criminal offense in the eyes of the proud, independent self-governing actors who—given
the issue of government legitimacy—have taken power for themselves.
Young people in Córdoba are also situating themselves within the national
experience, looking to tradition and precedence as an explanation for their subversive
behaviors. An interviewee stated the following after being asked if this trespassing
mentality was a product of Córdoba uniquely, or a nationwide attitude:
I believe it’s very Argentine, very Argentina to break the rules, to always look for
something to do that goes against what you’re told — it’s very Argentine, very cultural. 30

In many ways, this interview statement establishes that youth and everyday subversion
are merely an extension of the national cultural tradition; these actions are a

29

La gente si quieran reunir se va a reunir … La mayoría de la gente si quieran juntar se quieran
hacer algo lo va a hacer — ese el problema. Pueda controlar la forma solo de hacerlo por eso hay
tantas reuniones clandestinas.
30

“Yo creo que es muy argentino, muy argentino de traspasar las reglas, de siempre buscarle el
hacer la contra de lo que dice — muy argentino, muy cultural”
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continuation of the status-quo, rather than a specific response to the current political,
economic, and public health crisis. Once more, the youth of Córdoba are seeing cultural
tradition as an avenue to return to normalcy on their own terms, after being let down by
state actors.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored the nuance of rationalizing COVID-19 and the impact it
has had by the youth in Córdoba. I argue that despite a degree of empathy with the
government responses to the pandemic, young people are turning to self-rule to attain a
return to normalcy the government has failed to provide. Engaging in the politics of
everyday subversion — casual acts of rebellion against what is deemed illegitimate or
unnecessary — the youth of Córdoba have appropriated their own understanding of
what it means to be Argentine and what they are owed by the state. Frustrated by a
triple crisis that has created massive uncertainty, they have become brokers for their
own futures as they seek to rebuild a future in the wake of drastic changes that have
permanently altered the lives they once knew.
The impacts of COVID-19 have created a new space for the individual within
society, as an actor’s role in self-governance has become more critical due to the nature
of a spreading disease. In grappling with top-down mandates and protocols, the
individual is propelled into a moral debate, and as such is able to elect a form of self
governance in the face of policing insufficiencies. As inadequate government support,
economic collapse, and growing unemployment affect the people, they are afforded
growing agency through subversion. As local culture is redefined and government and
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world-views shift, the individual as an actor with heightened agency holds the position
to negotiate the terms of their involvement, choosing to work for or against preexisting
narratives and shape the future of entire communities.
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Conclusion
This thesis has examined the reaction of the people of Córdoba to the triple crisis
catalyzed by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with an emphasis on protest culture,
resistance, and youth subversion. I have argued that the youth of Córdoba, motivated by
disillusionment with the government, have turned to politics of everyday youth
subversion to reconcile state failures with the future they have lost on their own terms.
Coupling traditional Argentina tactics like protests and subversion with rebellious youth
subculture, the youth of Córdoba sought to reconstruct a sense of normalcy through the
solidarity of appropriating the world they once knew into a recreation of a recognizable
future for themselves.
The youth of Córdoba are faced with never before seen political, economic, and
public health circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown their futures and the
future of Argentina into a space of unprecedented uncertainty, but also altered the
understanding of everyday life. Young people in Córdoba have turned to everyday
subversion to restore a sense of normalcy and configure their new reality within the
framework of the nation they have always known. Young people have engaged in public
protests with other groups to denounce government failures to deal with the economic
and social implications of the pandemic, while also engaging in subcultural resistance in
everyday activities.
Chapter 2 examined the causes of the triple crisis as well as the context for
civilian disillusionment with government practices. It showed how the Macri and
Fernández administrations have each contributed to these crises, and the priorities and
strategies utilized by the current administration to address political, economic, and
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public health issues. As state failures became more evident, criticisms gave way to the
return of traditional protest practices to air communal grievances.
Chapter 3 examined 2020 protests in Córdoba, their adherence to traditional
practices, and modifications with respect to the public health crisis. This chapter
demonstrated an added layer of performativity to already salient protest practices
through tones of increasing subversion of public health protocols to draw greater
attention to a given cause. These events would eventually create a merging space for
underlying, everyday subversive youth behaviors as protests became a way to
appropriate public spaces into cultural events reminiscent of normal life and youth
culture in Córdoba.
Chapter 4 investigated youth responses to the triple crisis in Córdoba. This
chapter showed the nuance of understanding held by young people, in addition to the
way they rationalize and experience state failures. Disillusioned with the government,
youth in Córdoba turned to everyday subversion to reclaim their lives and reconstruct a
recognizable future for themselves in the wake of government failures to provide a
return to normalcy.
This project contributes to academic literature on Argentine political culture,
youth responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and research on Córdoba pertaining to
protests practices and youth culture. Based on participant observation and interviews
conducted in Córdoba during 2020, this project has explored the nuanced youth
experience to these unprecedented circumstances. Finally, it examines how Argentines
in the “second city” are reconfiguring themselves through protest culture and new
socialization practices amidst the pandemic. This study also begs questions for future
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research on the communal impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of Córdoba in
the construction and affirmation of the Argentine experience, and the role of youth in
the creation and perpetuation of culture and communal values.
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